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Continuing the Conversation:
Scholarly Inspiration
after Retirement.
An Interview with Ed James
Matthew R. Dasti
Ed James is Professor Emeritus of Philosophy at Bridgewater State University. His research
has been published in leading journals that include Mind and Ethics. His recent work
includes two papers, “Too Soon to Say” (July 2012) and “Beyond the Magical Thinking
Behind the Principal Principle” (July 2015). Ed taught at BSU 1976-2009. The interview
was conducted in summer 2015.
MRD: The idea for this interview has been
inspired by your robust research and scholarly
agenda since your retirement. What is it that
drives your continued scholarly work?
EJ: Writing philosophy has always been
one of my main ways of being alive, of being
totally present. It’s like playing a team sport in
that way, where for that time there is nothing
other than the awareness of the activity where the puck is, who has it, where the players are. So, too, with doing philosophy. That’s
all there is: a focus on the idea itself, with the
qualifications, the objections, the demands
for clarity, consistency, and completeness - all
those “players.” I still “keep up”—not as long
as I once could but, I hazard, as well as I ever
did. Teaching was that way, too, when a class
really sang. Though I miss teaching, now I can
focus my energy more on just the writing itself
and the engagement with the best reasoners
in the world.
MRD: I’m surprised with your answer. I was
expecting you to identify some problems
that have been your philosophical muse or
ongoing public debates about which you hope
to provide some clarity. But it seems that it is
scholarly life itself that inspires you.
EJ: My scholarly engagement is more the
Platonic quest for a certain kind of sensemaking or discovery, It is open-ended as I
hope to follow the argument wherever it
leads, seeking the sense of living in the immediacy of the intellectual quest.
MRD: What I find striking is that the idea that
what motivates you is the activity of philosophical writing, and getting lost in it, so to speak,
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and not so much a result you are concerned to
achieve. But insofar as there is inquiry there
must be some goal, right? Playing sports, at
our best we lose ourselves, but still there
is usually a goal and there are rules which
govern the sport in question. You’ve mentioned
some of the “rules,” so to speak, which govern
your work: concern with clarity, consistency,
completeness. But what is the desideratum?
Take your recent paper “Too Soon to Say”
( Philosophy 2012), which starts as a defense
of John Rawls from a certain line of criticism,
but wonderfully—in my mind—contains a
sustained argument that “disagreement does
not entail moral epistemic deficiency.” What do
you mean by this? Why is it important? What’s
at stake?
EJ: For me, philosophy should focus on the
issues that we disagree on (for example, the
existence of God, the meaning of life, the
proper organization of society), the issues that
put into question what a good reason is. Often
when we disagree, what counts as good
evidence or good reasons is itself part of the
debate, and we have to critically examine our
own perspective and assumptions. Because of
this, philosophers through millennia have had
logic and critical reasoning in general as a
primary pursuit. In the essay, “Too Soon to
Say,” I argue that the criteria we use to carry
on any inquiry—clarity, consistency, coherence, completeness; call them “the Cs”—
are internal to an inquiring conversation.
But while reflective inquiry depends on all of
these, just what those criteria mean, their
“weight,” is itself open to question. For me,
this is why the activity of philosophy is what

is central. Whatever arguments we make
will always be open to serious critique; it will
always be too soon to say the Last or Best
Word. And so it is that we develop our ideas,
taking account of the critiques of others, and
knowing fully that what we come up with will
be challenged. To be result oriented is to be
unaware that we are perpetually engaged in
a multi-perspective conversation. This is the
profoundly enriching aspect of philosophy.
MRD: So when you say “disagreement does
not entail moral epistemic deficiency” you are
recognizing that we can never be fully aware
of all of the resources available in support of
a given position. And we should thus avoiding
stigmatizing those who disagree with us.
EJ: Sometimes when people disagree, it
leads one party to conclude that the other is
not just intellectually wrong, but so unreasonable that he is morally wrong. We often
see this dynamic in political debates, ethical
debates, and the like. I am concerned with
the fact that we probably do this too much.
Moral epistemic deficiency addresses when
we should rightly criticize someone for being
culpably wrongheaded in reasoning – e.g.,
in ignoring past arguments, making obvious
fallacies – and when we should rather hold off
and recognize the give and take we confront
all the time in the criteria we use to judge
what it means to be reasonable. To engage in
reflective inquiry is to be committed to meeting what I called the Cs. That’s the good news.
It’s what unites all scholars, from scientists
to poets, in our work. But what is essential
to note here, and now the bad news, is that
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we are in tension, both among ourselves
and often within ourselves, as individuals,
as to how the Cs are to be understood and
prioritized. In philosophy, we have in the field
of political thought, say, the question of how
best to evaluate a government or a society. Do
we prioritize equality (as would liberals), liberty (libertarians), excellence (Aristotelians),
harmony (Confucians), divine command,
ecological or environmental balance? The list
goes on. Each one of these, and indeed, each
version of these, has strengths and weaknesses with respect to the Cs. For starters, each
one is initially incomplete from the perspective of the others and seeks either to show the
others how it can include their values or why it
should exclude their values when considering
political organization.
MRD: Your two points blend together nicely.
Philosophical inquiry focuses both on the
activity of sense-making or discovery, and
a concern to recognize that the criteria that
govern inquiry are, to some degree, fluid. They
seem to work together to hopefully produce
both an epistemic humility and a willingness
to continue the inquiry.
EJ: And I would draw from this a radical
conclusion. Too often, philosophers (myself
included) have viewed philosophy as politics
by other means. In this vein, philosophy has
had an essentially combative side to it – a
feeling that it is important to “win” the argument, to advance one’s cause. But if sense
making is truly coupled with epistemic humility, then what is important is not to win the
argument but to carry the discussion further in
the light of that uncertainty. This might sound
tame, but it is not, for it calls for a new view
of philosophic citizenship, where philosophy
has the political aim of keeping the inquiring
conversation going and keeping the standards
of reason, as ambiguous as they often are, in
view. This view involves turning on its head
the Platonic dictum that philosophers should
be leaders and to claim instead that citizens
should be philosophers in the sense that they
all, we all, carry a commitment to reason
together in the deep humility of inquiry. Until
citizens are philosophic in this sense, our
political decision-making will be doomed to
a kind of power struggle. The aim of teaching philosophy should be that of working to a
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new view of citizenship as an engagement in
political inquiry.
MRD: Thinking about philosophical citizenship, it seems that much of your work tries
to navigate how we deal with those things
that sit at the margins of public rationality
(pseudoscience, moral evil, the inner voice
of conscience, disagreement about the basic
criteria for rationality itself, etc.). But in your
latest work on probability (“Beyond the
Magical Thinking Behind the Principal
Principle”), you seem to be challenging a basic
feature of rationality by showing that projecting probabilities based on past experience
cannot be entirely justified in independent
grounds. Could you explain what you are
doing in this work, and how it connects to
your broader concerns?
EJ: My more recent work on applied probability continues my exploration of the strengths
and limits of reason. The strength of probability is that it does (or should) guide us in our
daily activities, but, and now a limit, it does
not apply to any particular single case. At first
glance this appears contradictory: probability
guides us, it does not apply in the single case,
and yet we act in the single case. A good
deal of scholarly work has tried to show that
probability does apply to the single case, work
that I argue does not succeed. For probability
is confirmed or disconfirmed by extended
observations of sequences or aggregate. To
claim, for example, that there is a 40% chance
of rain under these conditions is an elliptical way of saying that in the long run it rains
around 40% of the time in these conditions.
Hence, to apply probability to the single case,
to say that the 40% applies to this case is to
infer a property of the part, the single case,
from the property of the whole, the aggregate
or sequence. In thinking this way, we fall
prey to the fallacy of division, of mistakenly
thinking that a property of the whole must be
a property of its parts.
MRD: How then should we use probability to
guide us?
EJ: First, we need to be very clear that when
we speak of the probability of a single case
we are really speaking of a long-range projection: all we know, if we’ve got the long-range
distribution right, is that the type of event, in

this case rain, will hover around that distribution. Hence, when we make a bet on a
probability distribution (that is, let probability
guide us), our bet should be long-term, where
we ask ourselves whether we can stay the
course in the long run. Second, what of single
cases that are “one offs,” that don’t repeat
themselves? What of an operation, say, where
we are told by the surgeon that we have very
good chances of coming through it? Here,
there is no staying the course for us, for we
will, hopefully, meet this case but once. What
we want is just what we don’t have: probability applying here and now, the gods of chance
working on our behalf. Nor do we have what
the surgeon has: a long-run projection that
she lives through, knowing that most cases
over the long haul will hover around these
good odds. We, on the other hand, face “one
offs.” All we can do in these circumstances,
I argue, is bundle the many cases of similar
probabilities - the “good odds” of crossing the
street at a busy intersection, the good odds of
it not raining on our picnic - into one long-run
projection. What we know, then, is that the
long-run projection, even if we’ve got it right,
will come out bad in some of these cases and
we can’t pick the cases.
MRD: For me, one upshot of this critique is
that we must confront the inevitable place of
luck in our lives.
EJ: Precisely! Those of us who have had
“successful” lives, to my mind, too readily take
more credit (and spread more blame) than
is deserved. While we might have made all
the right decisions, in the end, the fact that
those decisions came out “right” was part and
parcel of a bundled probabilistic distribution.
All we can hope is that our good odds play out
in the matters that really count and that when
our plans do work out, we are more grateful
than proud.
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